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“TWO HOUSEHOLDS, BOTH ALIKE IN 
DIGNITY”: THE INTERNATIONAL FEUD 
BETWEEN ADMIRALTY AND 
BANKRUPTCY 
Two households, both alike in dignity, 
In fair Verona, where we lay our scene, 
From ancient grudge break to new mutiny, 
Where civil blood makes civil hands unclean. 
From forth the fatal loins of these two foes 
A pair of star-cross’d lovers take their life; 
Whose misadventured piteous overthrows 
Do with their death bury their parents’ strife. 
The fearful passage of their death-mark’d love, 
And the continuance of their parents’ rage, 
Which, but their children’s end, nought could remove, 
Is now the two hours’ traffic of our stage; 
The which if you with patient ears attend, 
What here shall miss, our toil shall strive to mend.1 
INTRODUCTION 
n 2012, the Japanese shipping firm Sanko Steamship Co. 
(“Sanko”) unilaterally refused to make lease payments on 
certain of its commercial shipping vessels.2 After Sanko 
stopped making its payments, multiple creditors, including the 
Liberian navigation firm Evridiki Navigation, Inc. (“Evridiki”), 
proceeded quasi in rem3 against the M/V Sanko Mineral (“the 
Mineral”) and attached the vessel while it was in port at Bal-
timore, Maryland.4 Sanko refused to post a bond, which would 
have released the Mineral, out of concern that such action 
would affect its private resolution process with its chief credi-
tors.5 The vessel, however, still contained cargo for which 
Sanko’s customers had already paid.6 Several of these custom-
ers, some incorporated abroad and others in the United States, 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 1, prologue. 
 2. Evridiki Navigation, Inc. v. Sanko S.S. Co., 880 F. Supp. 2d 666, 668 
(D. Md. 2012). 
 3. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 4. Evridiki, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 668. 
 5. In furtherance of its efforts to avoid a formal bankruptcy filing, Sanko 
had started a private resolution process with its chief creditors. Id. at 669. 
 6. Id. at 668. 
I
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intervened in the action in an attempt to vacate the attach-
ment of the Mineral so that they could receive their goods.7 The 
vessel remained attached in Baltimore, and one of the cargo 
owners, ThyssenKrupp Materials NA, Inc. (“ThyssenKrupp”), 
eventually proceeded in rem8 against the Mineral.9 
ThyssenKrupp claimed that it was under contract to have car-
go on the Mineral delivered to a customer within a certain win-
dow of time, that the window had closed, and that 
ThyssenKrupp therefore held a maritime lien on the Mineral.10 
Eventually, Sanko filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy recognition 
and protection11 (“Chapter 15”) in the United States, and 
ThyssenKrupp’s vessel arrest, along with Evridiki’s attach-
ment, was vacated.12 Evridiki Navigation, Inc. v. Sanko Steam-
ship Co. illustrates an evolving conflict―if Chapter 15 bank-
ruptcy can eviscerate a vessel arrest or attachment action so 
easily, then arrest and attachment cease to be effective tools for 
the enforcement of maritime liens, which are a vital source of 
rights in admiralty.13 
Evridiki is an apt example of cases that follow a similar pat-
tern: bankrupt, foreign companies using U.S. jurisdiction to 
escape creditor action in maritime claims. When Chapter 15 
works to preclude a vessel arrest or attachment, maritime cred-
itors are denied any recovery from the debtor, resulting in the 
unjust treatment of those creditors during the bankruptcy pro-
                                                                                                                                     
 7. Id. 
 8. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 9. Evridiki, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 668. 
 10. Id. 
 11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532 (2014) contains the U.S. implementation of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. This Note discusses Chapter 15 in 
some depth in Part II.B, but in pertinent part Chapter 15 allows a foreign 
company, which has already filed for bankruptcy abroad, to petition a U.S. 
bankruptcy court for recognition of the foreign bankruptcy proceeding. Upon 
recognition, Chapter 15 further allows a stay of all creditor actions against 
the foreign debtor. 
 12. After the Federal Bankruptcy Court recognized Sanko’s foreign bank-
ruptcy, it issued an order to the District of Maryland precluding the decision 
of any of the myriad issues in the case, except for the determination of Evri-
diki’s attachment of the Mineral. Evridiki, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 673–76. 
 13. WILLIAM TETLEY, MARITIME LIENS AND CLAIMS 937 (2d ed. 1998). 
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ceedings.14 Not only are the creditors responsible for court costs 
and filing fees, which can be quite expensive, but they also lose 
their original investment in the debtor who files for Chapter 15 
bankruptcy. As the economies of nations across the globe, de-
veloped and developing, become increasingly interdependent, 
the importance of the shipping industry will only grow.15 Even 
with recent advances in air freight and high speed rail, over-
seas shipping still accounts for “[a]round 80 per cent of global 
trade by volume and over 70 per cent by value.”16 Moreover, as 
the U.S. shipping industry continues to contract, shipping 
companies will increasingly be foreign in their citizenship.17 
This increase in foreign shippers necessarily means that more 
future maritime bankruptcies will be foreign, which will, in 
turn, lead to more Chapter 15 petitions in the United States. 
Such an increase in Chapter 15 filings will result in an increase 
in the abuse of creditors’ rights to enforce their maritime liens 
and claims, by barring the traditional means of executing those 
liens and claims—arrest and attachment. 
This Note suggests a solution to the imbalance between ad-
miralty and bankruptcy drawn from the history of U.S. mari-
time law and the response of the Commonwealth of Australia,18 
another large shipping nation that has adopted the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the “Model Law”), to 
                                                                                                                                     
 14. Melissa K. S. Alwang, Steering the Most Appropriate Course Between 
Admiralty and Insolvency: Why an International Insolvency Treaty Should 
Recognize the Primacy of Admiralty Law over Maritime Assets, 64 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2613, 2620 (1996). 
 15. See U.S. Dep’t Transp. Mar. Admin., U.S. Waterborne Foreign Trade 
by Trading Partners, 2003–2012, available at 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_an
d_Statistics.htm (last visited June 21, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Waterborne 
Foreign Trade by Trading Partners]; U.S. Dep’t Transp. Mar. Admin., U.S. 
Waterborne Foreign Container Trade by Trading Partners, 2007–2012, 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_an
d_Statistics.htm (last visited Jun 21, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Waterborne 
Foreign Container Trade by Trading Partners]. 
 16. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 
2013, at xi, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/RMT/2013, U.N. Sales No. E. 13.II.D.9 
(2013). 
 17. See U.S. Waterborne Foreign Trade by Trading Partners, supra note 
15; U.S. Waterborne Foreign Container Trade by Trading Partners, supra 
note 15. 
 18. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
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alleviate some of the tension for both admiralty and bankrupt-
cy sides of the argument. 
Part I of this Note examines the relevant admiralty law, in-
cluding the complexities of maritime liens as well as vessel ar-
rest and attachment provisions. Part II briefly explains the 
genesis of Chapter 15 as well as its functions pertinent to this 
Note’s argument. As the title of this Note suggests, the policies 
that inform the goals of bankruptcy and admiralty are often 
diametrically opposed, such that the tensions between the two 
are best addressed concurrently. To that end, Part III analyzes 
laws that grapple with the policy concerns surrounding the in-
tersection of admiralty and bankruptcy from the United States 
and the Commonwealth of Australia. Part IV discusses the cur-
rent imbalance between bankruptcy and admiralty, accompa-
nied by a caveat in the form of the Second Circuit’s electronic 
funds transfer cases (“EFT”),19 warning against tipping the 
scales too far in admiralty’s favor. Part V examines recent U.S. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence that supports stronger protec-
tions for admiralty rights. Ultimately, the solution is not a 
simple one. This Note argues that investors can be protected 
from heavy-handed bankruptcy courts, just as debtors can be 
protected from ravenous creditors, by implementing certain el-
ements of the Australian scheme in the U.S. system. 
I. ADMIRALTY: VESSEL ARREST, ATTACHMENT, AND MARITIME 
LIENS 
The three interdependent aspects of admiralty law that are 
crucial to understanding the tension between admiralty and 
bankruptcy are vessel arrest, vessel attachment, and maritime 
liens. Briefly, maritime liens20 are a legal construct that serve 
as a basis for many causes of action in maritime law.21 Mari-
time liens are, in turn, enforced by vessel arrest and attach-
ment actions. The interplay of maritime liens, vessel arrest, 
and vessel attachment is complex, but it must be understood in 
order to clarify the severity of the problem presented by Chap-
ter 15 bankruptcy protections in admiralty suits. 
                                                                                                                                     
 19. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 20. A maritime lien is “[a] lien on a vessel, given to secure the claim of a 
creditor who provided maritime services to the vessel or who suffered an in-
jury from the vessel’s use.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 943 (9th ed. 2009). 
 21. See Alwang, supra note 14, at 2629. 
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A. Arrest and Attachment: The Action in Rem and the Action 
Quasi in Rem 
Vessel arrest and attachment predate the founding of the 
American republic. Some scholars argue that arrest and at-
tachment have their roots in ancient Greek law, although the 
earliest extant mention is in the Byzantine emperor Justinian’s 
Corpus Iuris Civilis.22 More recently, however, the American 
implementations of vessel arrest and attachment were devel-
oped from the British Imperial system after the American Rev-
olution.23 Vessel arrests and attachments were, and are, a nat-
ural response to the frequently transitory nature of parties to 
admiralty suits.24 
A maritime attachment action is used when a plaintiff has 
any in personam claim in admiralty against another party.25 
Because maritime attachment, which directly affects a res, be 
it a vessel or other maritime property, can occur only when the 
attaching party has an in personam claim, it is considered a 
quasi in rem action. Furthermore, the maritime attachment—
or quasi in rem action—can be used against any property that 
is owned by the defendant.26 
Alternatively, the maritime vessel arrest—or in rem action—
is a suit against a physical vessel itself or other maritime prop-
erty such as cargo or freight. A maritime vessel arrest is only 
filed in order to foreclose on a maritime lien.27 One may bring 
                                                                                                                                     
 22. TETLEY, supra note 13, at 7–11. 
 23. “After renouncing British suzerainty in 1776, the United States re-
tained the Admiralty attachment, which is similar, but not identical, to the 
saisie conservatoire. Admiralty law in the United States has since advanced, 
giving American law its own particular cachet, flavor and much more.” Id. at 
37. 
 24. “Courts of admiralty are established for the settlement of disputes be-
tween persons engaged in commerce and navigation, who, on the one hand, 
may be absent from their homes for long periods of time, and, on the other 
hand, often have property or credits in other places.” In re Louisville Under-
writers, 134 U.S. 488, 493 (1890). 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADMIRALTY & MAR. CLAIMS B. In Personam Ac-
tions: Attachment and Garnishment; see Orbis Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. 
TEC Marine Lines, Ltd., 692 F. Supp. 280, 284–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. B. 
 27. Additionally, the property named in the in rem action must be the sub-
ject of the same maritime lien that the plaintiff is seeking to enforce. See FED. 
R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADMIRALTY & MAR. CLAIMS C. In Rem Actions: Special Provi-
sions; Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954); Chelentis v. Lucken-
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an in rem action by itself, or together with a quasi in rem ac-
tion, but maritime attachment is not an alternative to the ves-
sel arrest action.28 U.S. admiralty law is unique in its use of 
maritime attachment and vessel arrest, as many other common 
law nations only allow a vessel arrest action.29 The strength of 
U.S. arrest and attachment provisions can be traced to the co-
lonial period, when a poor quality road network forced the ear-
ly American colonists to rely heavily on shipping.30 
Maritime attachment has two primary ends: “first, to compel 
appearance; [second], to condemn for satisfaction.”31 That is to 
say, maritime attachment first gains the libelant32 jurisdiction 
and second guarantees recovery in the event of a favorable de-
cision. Maritime attachment has relatively simple procedural 
steps, of which only one is necessary to expound upon in 
depth.33 There is a requirement in the U.S. maritime attach-
ment procedure that “the defendant cannot be found within the 
district.”34 This step in the maritime attachment test is particu-
larly important to the discussion here because the provision 
allows foreign libelees to be haled into U.S. courts. Unfortu-
nately, the state of being absent from the district is not defined 
                                                                                                                                     
bach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 
(1866). 
 28. William Tetley, Arrest, Attachment, and Related Maritime Law Proce-
dures, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1895, 1934–35 (1999). 
 29. Id. at 1899. 
 30. FRANK L. MARAIST, THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., & CATHERINE M. MARAIST, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON MARITIME LAW 1 (2d ed. 2009). 
 31. Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. 473, 489 (1825); see Swift & Co. Packers v. 
Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 693 (1950). 
 32. In admiralty suits, the plaintiff is referred to as the libelant, while the 
defendant is referred to as the libelee. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (9th 
ed. 2009). 
 33. Tetley, supra note 28, at 1936. 
Procedurally, Supplemental Rule B requires the plaintiff to file a de-
tailed complaint, accompanied by an affidavit. The plaintiff must 
show: (1) that he has an in personam claim against the defendant; 
(2) that the defendant cannot be found within the district where the 
action is commenced; (3) that property belonging to the defendant is 
present, or soon will be present, in the district; and (4) there is no 
statutory or general maritime law proscription to the attachment. 
Id. 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADMIRALTY & MAR. CLAIMS B. In Personam Ac-
tions: Attachment and Garnishment. 
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in the statute, a lacuna that has led a specific test to arise from 
the case law.35 
The two-pronged subtest that has developed from a want of a 
statutory definition is “based upon jurisdiction and the service 
of process.”36 First, the jurisdictional element of the test de-
pends upon the same “minimum contacts” reasoning that the 
U.S. Supreme Court used in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington.37 If the libelee is found to have “minimum contacts” 
“within the district,” then maritime attachment is not viable. If 
the libelee is found not to have “minimum contacts” “within the 
district,” then the action proceeds to the notice, or service of 
process, prong of the test, which requires that the libelee not 
have an “office or authorized agent in the district where or 
through whom legal process may be served upon him.”38 If both 
of these prongs are found in the affirmative, then the libelee is 
considered “found within the district” and the maritime at-
tachment of his property is considered inappropriate. If either 
of the prongs is found in the negative, then the libelee is con-
sidered absent from the district and maritime attachment is 
considered proper, subject to the other statutory requirements 
in the provision. 39 
Maritime attachment is one of the most envied U.S. admiral-
ty tools in the world, and it is not available in many other 
                                                                                                                                     
 35. Tetley, supra note 28, at 1935. 
 36. Id. 
 37. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of 
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.” 
Id. 
 38. TETLEY, supra note 13, at 939–40. 
 39. Oregon v. Tug Go Getter, 398 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1968) (libelee 
considered within the district where he had minimum contacts within that 
district); W. Bulk Carriers, Pty. v. P.S. Int’l, 762 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (S.D. 
Ohio 1991) (“[I]t is clear that defendant could not have been found within this 
district at the time of the attachment for purposes of service of process.”); 
LaBanca v. Ostermunchner, 664 F.2d 65, 67–68 (5th Cir. 1981) (interpreting 
“within the district” to mean a state’s individual district; where service on 
libelee was available in the Northern District of Florida but not the Southern 
District of Florida, maritime attachment was allowed). 
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common law countries precisely because it is so liberal and 
powerful when compared with vessel arrest.40 Indeed, “[t]he 
United States has . . . led the world in developing and imple-
menting effective constitutional protections of the private prop-
erty rights of shipowners with respect to . . . [vessel] arrest. In 
that domain in particular, U.S. maritime law can well serve as 
a model for other nations.”41 It should come as no great sur-
prise, then, that when bankruptcy courts can nullify an at-
tachment, it throws the U.S. maritime legal system dangerous-
ly off course. 
B. Maritime Liens: The Complex Source of Admiralty Rights 
“Maritime liens are the product of the evolution of custom, 
statute, and judicial decisions. To understand them, one must 
understand the history of maritime law.”42 
The creation and use of maritime liens to advance public poli-
cy at sea is of ancient vintage, dating to the lex maritima43 of 
ancient Rome and Byzantium.44 As admiralty law developed 
around the world, it was necessary to develop a legal construct 
that could “enforce financial obligations acquired international-
ly.”45 This construct is the maritime lien, and it is so important 
to the operation of admiralty law that some exposition about 
the convoluted and technical nature of these liens is necessary. 
A traditional maritime lien is a secured right peculiar to mar-
itime law (the lex maritima). It is a privilege against property 
(a ship) which attaches and gains priority without any court 
action or any deed or any registration. It passes with the ship 
when the ship is sold to another owner, who may not know of 
the existence of the lien. In this sense the maritime lien is a 
                                                                                                                                     
 40. See Tetley, supra note 28, at 1939–40. 
 41. Id. at 1940. 
 42. TETLEY, supra note 13, at 60. For an exhaustive explanation of the his-
tory of maritime liens, Professor Tetley’s book is an outstanding resource. 
Unfortunately, there is no space in this Note to give that history anything 
more than a cursory glance. 
 43. Lex maritima is “[t]he body of customs, usage, and local rules govern-
ing seagoing commerce that developed in the maritime countries of medieval 
Europe.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 931 (9th ed. 2009). 
 44. See also TETLEY, supra note 13, at 1–56. (providing an extensive dis-
cussion of the history of maritime liens accompanied by explanations of how 
they relate to the operation of the modern shipping industry). 
 45. Alwang, supra note 14, at 2630. 
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secret lien which has no equivalent in the common law; rather 
it fulfills the concept of a “privilege” under the civil law and 
the lex mercatoria.46 
Maritime liens are undoubtedly complicated, and the order in 
which they rank in court can be arcane. The procedure of bal-
ancing a general lien on a vessel’s freight with a preferred mar-
itime lien or a secured lien, while difficult, can be done.47 De-
spite the inherent complexities, over the centuries, admiralty 
law has developed a system of ranking liens in the order in 
which they must be fulfilled by a ship’s master or the party re-
sponsible for the ship’s operation.48 These rankings differ be-
tween nations, but only slightly.49 More important to this anal-
ysis, former British territories rank their maritime liens in a 
similar manner, making a comparison much simpler.50 Conven-
iently, however, neither the ranking methods nor the rankings 
themselves are salient for the purposes of this Note; only the 
fact that the liens are ranked is important to the argument 
here. 
Maritime liens are vital to the operation of admiralty law be-
cause they provide the causes of action for a large number of 
suits. 51 Admiralty causes of action are based in maritime liens 
for disputes ranging from collision damage caused by a ship to 
preferred ship’s mortgages, to marine insurance premiums.52 
“In addition to recognizing a larger number of maritime liens 
than any other nation, U.S. maritime law is uniquely rich in 
affording admiralty claimants both the attachment and arrest 
in rem as mechanisms for asserting their claims and obtaining 
pre-judgment security.”53 In fact, the most common remedy to 
                                                                                                                                     
 46. TETLEY, supra note 13, at 59–60. “For example, a sailor who suffers an 
injury on ship has a lien which arose and attached to the vessel automatically 
upon the injury.” Alwang, supra note 14, at 2630. 
 47. For a detailed discussion of the prioritization of maritime liens, see 
George L. Varian, Rank and Priority of Maritime Liens, 47 TUL. L. REV. 753 
(1973). 
 48. See TETLEY, supra note 13, at 855–58. 
 49. See generally id. at 858–912 (extensive discussion of systems used to 
rank maritime liens in several nations). 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Alwang, supra note 14, at 2629–31. 
 52. See TETLEY, supra note 13, at xii–xiii. 
 53. Tetley, supra note 28, at 1939. 
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suits for the enforcement of maritime liens is vessel arrest.54 In 
U.S. courts, however, the interaction of maritime liens, and 
hence vessel arrests, with bankruptcy proceedings are con-
founded because, despite the fact that “bankruptcy judges have 
no specific grant of admiralty jurisdiction,” bankruptcy judges 
“may exercise jurisdiction over the validity and priority of mar-
itime liens.”55 This intrusion by bankruptcy courts into admi-
ralty disputes is the crux of the problem that this Note at-
tempts to address. 
II. BANKRUPTCY: THE U.N.’S MODEL LAW AND CHAPTER 15 
Bankruptcy is a complex legal system, with a pedigree nearly 
as venerable as admiralty’s. International bankruptcy,56 while 
a much younger variant of bankruptcy, is relatively easily un-
derstood once a basic framework has been established. This 
section will establish that framework before laying out the 
problem created by the current international bankruptcy re-
gime’s effects on admiralty law. It will also propose a solution 
to that problem in the United States based on a fortuitous con-
fluence of Australian law.57 
                                                                                                                                     
 54. See John S. Rogers, Enforcement of Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 47 
TUL. L. REV. 767, 767 (1973). 
 55. 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 520–22 (2d 
ed. 1994); 
While one heard of complaints from the admiralty bar that judges 
without tenure and the other perquisites of article III judges could 
not constitutionally exercise admiralty jurisdiction, the validity of 
the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts seems to 
have never been authoritatively determined in a published opinion. 
As previously noted, however, the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., in-
validated title 11’s grant of comprehensive jurisdiction to the bank-
ruptcy courts. 
Frank Kennedy, Jurisdictional Problems Between Admiralty and Bankruptcy 
Courts, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1182, 1198 (1985). 
 56. “Bankruptcy” is synonymous with “insolvency.” Which word is used 
depends upon the lexicon of the legislature writing a particular statute. See 
Cross Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) s 1 (Austl.); U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L 
TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH 
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, at 3–4, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 
(2014). 
 57. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
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A. The Model Law 
As commerce in the late twentieth century became increas-
ingly globalized, it was clear to UNCITRAL58 and the interna-
tional legal apparatus that some regularization and uniformity 
would be helpful both in the business of trade and in the busi-
ness of law.59 One of UNCITRAL’s efforts to create a blanket 
international bankruptcy scheme is the Model Law.60 Although 
the Model Law has only been accepted by a handful of U.N. 
states,61 and despite its relative youth, it has already had sig-
nificant legal and economic effects in at least two member na-
tions—the United States and Australia.62 
B. Chapter 15 
Chapter 15 of the United States Code replaced the old Sec-
tion 304 of the Bankruptcy Code and is the United States’ im-
plementation of UNCITRAL’s Model Law.63 Chapter 15 has five 
stated purposes, which are derived from its international 
origin.64 First, any interpretation of Chapter 15 “must be coor-
dinated with the interpretation given by other countries that 
have adopted it as an internal law to promote a uniform and 
coordinated legal regime for cross-border insolvency cases.”65 
The goal of normalization in Chapter 15’s first stated purpose 
is further supported by the other enumerated purposes, which 
are as follows: 
(2) greater legal certainty for trade and investment; (3) fair 
and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that 
                                                                                                                                     
 58. Welcome, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.html 
(last visited June 21, 2014). 
 59. Id. at 1997; UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with 
Guide to Enactment. 
 60. UNCITRAL, supra note 56. 
 61. Nineteen nations, to be exact. Status, UNCITRAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_stat
us.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 62. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 11–18; see discussion 
infra Part III.A.1. 
 63. 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2014). 
 64. Id. § 1501(a). 
 65. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Chapter 15, U.S. COURTS (last 
visited June 21, 2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapt
er15.aspx. 
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protects the interests of all creditors, and other interested en-
tities, including the debtor; (4) protection and maximization of 
the value of the debtor’s assets; and (5) facilitation of the res-
cue of financially troubled businesses, thereby protecting in-
vestment and preserving employment.66 
A Chapter 15 bankruptcy case is typically filed in order to 
protect a foreign debtor’s assets that exist or are contempora-
neously located in the United States.67 The threshold that a 
party must meet to gain Chapter 15 protections is relatively 
low.68 The party seeking bankruptcy protections must petition 
the court for “recognition of a foreign proceeding.”69 The statute 
defines a foreign proceeding as follows: 
[A] collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a for-
eign country, including an interim proceeding, under a law re-
lating to insolvency or adjustment of debt in which proceeding 
the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or 
supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganiza-
tion or liquidation.70 
This petition process leads to what has come to be known pro-
fessionally as the “Chapter 15 gap period.”71 This “gap period” 
occurs between the filing of the petition for recognition and the 
recognition hearing before the bankruptcy court. Although the 
debtor is not automatically protected by the Bankruptcy Code 
after petitioning for recognition, if he fears that a creditor may 
take action against him before the recognition hearing, then 
the debtor may move for provisional protections after the filing 
and before the hearing.72 These protections are injunctive and 
terminate after the recognition hearing takes place.73 Further-
more, this temporary relief differs from the permanent relief 
offered after the hearing in that only debtor property that is 
“perishable, susceptible to devaluation, or otherwise in jeop-
                                                                                                                                     
 66. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a). 
 67. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 65. 
 68. 11 U.S.C. § 1504. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2014); see In re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R. 266 (Bankr. 
D. Nev. 2009). 
 71. Bruce Nathan & Eric Horn, Demystifying Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, BUS. CREDIT, June 2009, at 1, 2. 
 72. 11 U.S.C. § 1519(a)(1) (2014). 
 73. Id. § 1519(b)–(e). The temporary relief terminates unless extended un-
der Section 1521(a)(6), which allows for such an extension. 
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ardy” is given to the debtor.74 As the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law eloquently states: 
The reason for the availability of collective measures, albeit in 
a restricted form, is that relief of a collective nature may be 
urgently needed already before the decision on recognition in 
order to protect the assets of the debtor and the interests of 
the creditors. Exclusion of collective relief would frustrate 
those objectives. On the other hand, recognition has not yet 
been granted and, therefore, the collective relief is restricted 
to urgent and provisional measures.75 
Once a foreign proceeding is recognized by the court, the 
court must then determine whether that proceeding is “main” 
or “non-main.”76 A main proceeding is “a foreign proceeding 
pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its 
main interests.”77 A non-main proceeding is “a foreign proceed-
ing, other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a country 
where the debtor has an establishment.”78 While the statute 
defines a debtor’s establishment as “any place of operations 
where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic activi-
ty,” it does not define a debtor’s center of main interests.79 The 
Bankruptcy Code, however, does contain a rebuttable presump-
tion that “the debtor’s registered office . . . is presumed to be 
the center of the debtor’s main interests.”80 After an order 
granting recognition of a foreign proceeding, many of the pro-
tections granted by the other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code 
are afforded to the Chapter 15 debtor.81 These protections de-
                                                                                                                                     
 74. Id. § 1519(a)(2). 
 75. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON 
INSOLVENCY LAW, at 341, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005). 
 76. 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b) (2014). 
 77. Id. § 1502(4). 
 78. Id. § 1502(5). 
 79. Id. § 1502(2). 
 80. Id. § 1516(c). Much ink has been spilled over how to determine a debt-
or’s center of main interests. The case law seems to accept the European rule 
that the debtor’s center of main interests is “the place where the debtor con-
ducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore 
ascertainable by third parties.” In re Tri-Cont’l Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 634 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006). Cf. In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit 
Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 389 B.R. 325, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citation 
omitted) (listing factors that could be taken into consideration in determining 
a center of main interests). 
 81. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1520–1521. 
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pend, naturally, upon whether the foreign proceeding is found 
to be main or non-main. If the foreign proceeding is found to be 
non-main, then the protections granted depend upon the bank-
ruptcy judge’s discretion and the relief requested by the foreign 
company’s representative.82 Types of relief include the staying 
of proceedings against debtor assets, suspension of the right to 
transfer or dispose of debtor assets, granting administration of 
debtor assets to the debtor’s foreign representative, and exten-
sion of the provisional relief granted after filing by Section 
1519(a).83 In the event that a proceeding is recognized as a for-
eign main proceeding, Section 1520 imparts the protections 
granted by the more general chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, 
including automatic stay of proceedings against debtor assets,84 
avoidance of post-petition transactions,85 and security of after-
acquired property,86 among others.87 
The only bulwark opposite the many debtor protections pro-
vided by Chapter 15 is the paltry Section 1522, which provides 
for the discretionary protection of creditor interests in the 
debtor.88 This section states, in pertinent part, that all of the 
protections granted by Chapter 15 are at the judge’s discre-
tion.89 That is, if the protections granted by the Bankruptcy 
Code would unjustly harm the interests of creditors or other 
parties to the bankruptcy proceedings, it is within the judge’s 
discretion to modify or terminate that relief as he sees fit.90 
With judicial oversight as the only defense for creditors in a 
                                                                                                                                     
 82. Id. § 1521(a). 
 83. Id. § 1519(a). 
 84. Id. § 362. 
 85. Id. § 549. 
 86. Id. § 552. 
 87. Id. § 1520. 
 88. Id. § 1522. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. For a brief look at when courts have considered the application of 
Section 1522, see In re Tri-Cont’l Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 637 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. 2006) (court withheld debtor assets from foreign representative in order 
to protect U.S. creditors); In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. 547, 571 
(E.D. Va. 2010) (court remanded case where “the Bankruptcy Court did not, 
as required by §1522, adequately balance the parties’ respective interests”); 
In re Int’l Banking Corp. B.S.C., 439 B.R. 614, 626–27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2010); SNP Boat Serv. S.A. v. Hotel Le St. James, 483 B.R. 776 (S.D. Fla. 
2012). 
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vessel arrest action, it should come as no surprise that Chapter 
15 has confounded admiralty suits in the United States. 
III. “FROM ANCIENT GRUDGE BREAK TO NEW MUTINY”: 
CONFLICTS OF POLICY BETWEEN ADMIRALTY AND BANKRUPTCY 
The differing goals of maritime law and bankruptcy cause a 
great deal of conflict when both regimes coexist in the same 
case.91 The two legal regimes are at constant odds with one an-
other because “[a]lthough the scope of admiralty jurisdiction 
over contracts may be in flux, the freedom and sanctity of the 
contract is sacred in maritime law. Bankruptcy law turns con-
tracts on their heads as it allows debtors to reject contracts or 
avoid contractual transactions.”92 Maritime law has been stead-
ily losing the battle with bankruptcy law in the United States 
because bankruptcy courts are given broad powers to take ju-
risdiction in cases related to bankruptcy. While practitioners of 
admiralty law may rankle at the infringement of bankruptcy 
onto admiralty jurisdiction, there are good policy reasons for 
the expansive and wide-reaching nature of U.S. bankruptcy 
law. 
The most important reason for bankruptcy protections, argu-
ably, is the defrayment of risk among entrepreneurs, produc-
ers, and employers.93 Innovation and production are founda-
tional principles of capitalist economies, but innovators and 
producers will not be willing to take the risks necessary to 
compete in such an economy without some manner of a safety 
net.94 Businesses have inherent value, and when they become 
insolvent, there is often societal interest in helping them con-
tinue to function.95 A prime example of the benefits of bank-
ruptcy protection is obvious from a basic analysis of the Beth-
lehem Steel bankruptcy.96 When businesses fail, the goods and 
                                                                                                                                     
 91. See Graydon S. Staring, Bankruptcy―An Historical View, 59 TUL. L. 
REV. 1157, 1166 (1985); Gary F. Seitz, Interaction Between Admiralty and 
Bankruptcy Law: Effects of Globalization and Recurrent Tensions, 83 TUL. L. 
REV. 1339, 1359 (2009). 
 92. Seitz, supra note 91, at 1352. 
 93. Id. at 1353. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1353–54. 
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services that they produce are no longer available for consump-
tion, their workers lose their employment, and their creditors 
are unable to recover their full investment.97 Aside from avoid-
ing these societal evils, the purpose of bankruptcy as a legal 
regime is threefold: to provide the debtor with a “fresh start,”98 
to distribute a debtor’s remaining assets to his creditors, and to 
allow debts to be reorganized in order to allow a debtor to con-
tinue operating.99 
While the protection of debtors and the creation of an eco-
nomic safety net for business owners are noble and necessary 
functions of bankruptcy law, they conflict intrinsically with the 
rights of creditors in admiralty suits.100 Those rights in admi-
ralty suits have been called “aggressive” primarily because 
they favor creditors.101 Maritime law, with its focus on protect-
ing creditors’ rights at the expense of the debtor,102 is in apposi-
tion with bankruptcy’s orderly procession of creditors that is 
designed to protect the debtor and nurture him back to health 
as a functional, profitable company.103 Admiralty law, however, 
                                                                                                                                     
Bethlehem Steel was at one time one of the largest shipbuilding 
companies in the world and one of the most powerful symbols of 
American industrial manufacturing leadership. Bethlehem Steel 
“failed”: they were no longer paying their debts as they became due. 
Liabilities exceeded assets and the company had a negative net 
worth. The company listed inexpensive steel imports and numerous 
high pension payments as causes of its bankruptcy. Would we be 
better off if Bethlehem Steel disappeared from the face of the earth? 
Tens of thousands of people would be out of work. The nation would 
lose a major source of steel, an important component of national in-
dustrial production. Finally, recovery by creditors would be limited. 
Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Preven-
tion and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 566 (2005) 
(quoting President George W. Bush from his signing ceremony address, “[the 
bankruptcy laws] give those who cannot pay their debts a fresh start”). 
 99. Seitz, supra note 91, at 1354–55. 
 100. Id. at 1357–58. 
 101. Id. 
 102. “[A] primary purpose of maritime law is to support a strong merchant 
marine by favoring creditors.” Seitz, supra note 91, at 1352 (alteration in 
original) (quoting John A. Edginton, 3B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 1–21 
(2008)). 
 103. Bankruptcy is designed to protect debtors by giving them “a new op-
portunity in life and clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure 
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was developed over centuries to deal with the complex mari-
time industry as it matured globally; an industry that must 
face the difficulties posed by property that is singularly expen-
sive and internationally mobile—seagoing vessels.104 Maritime 
liens, as mentioned previously,105 are the solution to the innate 
complications involved in securing rights in maritime com-
merce. Likewise, vessel arrest and attachment actions are the 
primary, effective means of enforcing the rights created by 
maritime liens.106 If the vessel arrest and attachment actions, 
or the maritime lien they guarantee, are not protected, the al-
ready beleaguered U.S. shipping industry will be irrevocably 
damaged. Additionally, admiralty was the original internation-
al law107 and, as such, lacks many of the underpinnings of state 
or nationally centered interests that other legal regimes, like 
bankruptcy, naturally possess.108 As the U.S. shipping industry 
continues to contract,109 large shipping corporations will in-
creasingly be foreign in their citizenship, 110 which will lead to 
                                                                                                                                     
and discouragement of preexisting debt.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 
234, 244 (1934). 
 104. Alwang, supra note 14, at 2628–29. 
 105. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 106. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 107. See generally William W. Adams, Constitutional History―Development 
of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the United States, 8 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 157 
(1986) (discussing early interpretations of the U.S. Constitution, Article III, 
Section 2, which grants admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts); William R. 
Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, 
Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (1993) (providing a histori-
cal account of early admiralty jurisprudence); Hertz v. Treasure Chest Casi-
no, LLC, 274 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. La. 2003) (featuring Judge Fallon’s excel-
lent analysis of the evolution of admiralty jurisdiction in the United States). 
 108. Alwang, supra note 14, at 2629. 
 109. See U.S. Dep’t Transp. Mar. Admin., U.S. Waterborne Foreign Trade 
by U.S. Custom Districts, 2003–2012, available at 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_an
d_Statistics.htm (last visited June 21, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Waterborne 
Foreign Trade by U.S. Custom Districts]. 
 110. See U.S. Dep’t Transp. Mar. Admin., Top 25 Flag of Registry (Septem-
ber 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_an
d_Statistics.htm [hereinafter Top 25 Flag of Registry]. 
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an increase in the use of Chapter 15 bankruptcy by debtors to 
escape creditors in the United States.111 
A. The Land Down Under: Australia’s Serendipitous Solution to 
the Problem 
While the United States wrestles with the difficulties im-
posed by the Model Law’s interaction with admiralty law, an 
analysis of another nation’s implementation of the Model Law 
is informative. It should be noted that a meager number of 
U.N. member states have only recently adopted the Model 
Law.112 The combination of a lack of adherents and recent ac-
quiescence translates to a paucity of case law in the few na-
tions that have implemented the Model Law, and a particular 
want of case law within the realm of admiralty. One may, how-
ever, still draw inferences about the way that vessel arrests 
would interact with the Model Law in these states, based on 
what little case law exists. This Note chose a state for compari-
son out of the group of nations that were once British colonies 
or territories for a number of reasons. The foremost of those 
reasons is that most former British territories share a common 
heritage of admiralty law.113 This common legal heritage114 
means that the law of the comparison nation is similar enough 
                                                                                                                                     
 111. A comparison of the rise in U.S. imports, a decline in U.S. exports, and 
a steadily shrinking U.S. private fleet reveals contraction within the U.S. 
merchant marine that will likely continue in the future. As such, many, if not 
most, future maritime bankruptcies will be foreign in nature, leading to in-
creasing conflicts between U.S. admiralty law and the tenets of U.N. solu-
tions to cross-border insolvency represented by Chapter 15 of the U.S. Code. 
 112. Status, UNCITRAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_stat
us.html (last visited June 21, 2014) (listing states that have adopted the 
Model Law together with the dates of their various adoptions). 
 113. The Siren, 80 U.S. 389, 393 (1871) (“From the close of the Revolution 
down to this time it has continued to be our law, so far as it is adapted to the 
altered circumstances and condition of the country, and has not been modi-
fied by the proper national authorities.”); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 
13 U.S. 191, 198 (1815) (“The United States having, at one time, formed a 
component part of the British empire, their prize law was our prize law. 
When we separated, it continued to be our prize law, so far as it was adapted 
to our circumstances.”). 
 114. See TETLEY, supra note 13, at 1265–1410 (discussing states that have a 
developed vessel arrest codex). 
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to make such a comparison both possible and fruitful.115 The 
second reason is that due to the British Empire’s nature as a 
maritime power, and as a part of its imperial heritage, many, if 
not all formerly British nations have developed a virile mer-
chant marine, making the shipping industry of great economic 
significance to those states.116 The maritime tradition of these 
states is important simply because it ensures that the state se-
lected will have enough case law and statutory law, although 
certainly not a surplus of either, to facilitate an analysis. The 
third and final reason is a simple one; many formerly British 
nations share the English language as their mother tongue, 
making research and analysis much easier. 
The Commonwealth of Australia is one of the best examples 
of a state with a strong maritime heritage117 that has also 
adopted the Model Law.118 While Australia did adopt the Model 
Law largely without reservation via the Cross Border Insolven-
cy Act of 2008,119 the Australian Parliament has added some 
helpful interpretation to guide the implementation of the 
law.120 Although Australia has a different legal regime, which 
informs their deployment of the Model Law in relation to admi-
ralty, it still offers an example that may allow the U.S. legal 
system to achieve a middle path between the powerful, creditor 
centric tools of admiralty law and the equally robust debtor 
protections of bankruptcy law. 
1. The Australian Adoption of the Model Law and Yu v. STX 
Pan Ocean 
The Australian statute delimits some specific types of bank-
rupts, insolvent individuals or entities in the Australian statu-
                                                                                                                                     
 115. See Status, supra note 112. 
 116. See Top 25 Flag of Registry, supra note 110. 
 117. See BUREAU OF INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSP. & REG’L ECON., STATISTICAL 
REPORT: AUSTRALIAN SEA FREIGHT 2–3 (2012). 
 118. Cross Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) s 1 (Austl.) 
 119. The Parliament of Australia went so far as to attach the Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency as a schedule to its own statute and insert it into 
existing Australian law “with as few changes as are necessary to adapt it to 
the Australian context.” Id. sch 1. 
 120. The Australian Parliament wrote an explanatory memorandum to ac-
company its adoption of the Model Law and guide the implementation of the 
Model Law. Explanatory Memorandum, Cross Border Insolvency Act 2008 
(Cth) 6 (Austl). 
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tory language, who are not protected by certain elements of the 
Cross Border Insolvency Act 2008 (“Cross-Border Insolvency 
Act”). This approach essentially creates an exception to the 
Model Law for particular types of debtors.121 While this is an 
attractive option for parties interested in placing some con-
straints on the implementation of the Model Law, it is not 
without its faults. The first of those faults is the fact that such 
a system of exceptions would grant the enacting government 
power to favor certain industries122 or institutions that are con-
sidered systemic.123 Such favoritism in a free market economy 
is unsavory, at best, as it allows the government to choose 
“winners and losers” on an economic level. A second fault of the 
exceptions approach is the possibility of a slippery slope. Once 
a legislature begins to generate exceptions to the protections of 
the Model Law, it may continue to create exceptions until the 
law is so diluted as to be useless. 
Despite the risks inherent in the creation of exceptions to the 
Model Law, the Federal Court of Australia has done just that 
in its recent decision in Yu v. STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd.124 In Yu, 
the court held that vessel arrests made in pursuance of certain 
maritime liens would be exempt from the exclusive protections 
offered to the debtor under the Cross-Border Insolvency Act, 
which imports the Model Law into Australian law.125 In a 
somewhat confusing nexus of parliamentary acts, the only ar-
rests protected are those that are made to enforce maritime 
liens that impart to the lienor the status of a “secured credi-
tor.”126 These liens are protected because of a clause in another 
                                                                                                                                     
 121. “It is proposed to exclude corporate entities that are currently subject 
to special insolvency regimes at the Commonwealth level (including financial 
institutions) from the scope of the Model Law. Views of States and Territories 
will be sought on exclusion of further types of entities under special insolven-
cy frameworks.” CORPORATE LAW ECON. REFORM PROGRAM, CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY: PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION, 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: PAPER NO. 8, at 26 (2002) [hereinafter CLERP]. 
 122. See The Decline and Fall of General Motors: Detroitosaurus 
Wrecks, ECONOMIST, Jun. 6, 2009, at 78. 
 123. See AIG: Cheque Mate, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 2008, at 22. 
 124. Yu v STX Pan Ocean Co., (2013) FCR 680 (Austl.). 
 125. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. 
 126. Security rights are created in a maritime lien when the lien involves 
claims for salvage, claims for collision damages caused by a ship, claims for 
wages of a ship’s master or crew, and claims for a master’s disbursement. 
Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) s 15 (Austl.). 
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parliamentary act, the Corporations Act 2001 (“Corporations 
Act”), which provides in pertinent part that the stay of proceed-
ings allowed by the Australian Model Law shall not affect “a 
secured creditor’s right to realise or otherwise deal with [a] se-
curity interest.”127 Thanks to this protection of secured credi-
tors’ interests128 in the Corporations Act and the Model Law’s 
reservation that local laws, such as the Corporations Act, are 
allowed to survive its implementation,129 the Honorable Justice 
J. Buchanan was able to rule that bankruptcy law could not 
trump admiralty law at every turn, and that in certain cases, 
admiralty actions must be allowed to proceed.130 Justice Bu-
chanan succinctly explains the problem between the two legal 
regimes of admiralty and insolvency in Australia: 
Criticism has been made of the terms of the Model Law by 
reason of its failure to recognise and take appropriate account 
of international maritime law and the operation in Australian 
jurisdictions of the Admiralty Act. I do not propose to take up 
those matters in the present judgment, but those criticisms 
draw attention to the fact that, for centuries, international 
maritime law developed its own security regimes for reasons 
which remain generally observed around the world, including 
in Australia.131 
He goes on to illustrate that maritime liens, by their very na-
ture as an action in rem, are securities as discussed in Section 
471C of the Corporations Act.132 Justice Buchanan also estab-
lishes a rule for other judges exercising their discretion in the 
granting of bankruptcy protections, stating that “[w]hether an 
arrest would issue would depend on the circumstances, the 
reason why the arrest was sought and the interest sought to be 
vindicated by the [arrest].”133 
The astute analyst will note, however, that the combination 
of Australian statutes allowed for the Federal Court of Austral-
                                                                                                                                     
 127. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 471C (Austl.). 
 128. “Nothing in section 471A or 471B affects a secured creditor’s right to 
realise or otherwise deal with the security interest.” Id. 
 129. Yu v STX Pan Ocean Co., (2013) FCR 680, ¶ 36 (Austl.) (“Article 20(2) 
preserves the operation of local insolvency laws.”); see also UNCITRAL, supra 
note 56, at 20(2). 
 130. Yu, (2013) FCR at ¶¶ 41–42. 
 131. Id. at ¶ 39. 
 132. Id. at ¶ 40. 
 133. Id. at ¶ 41. 
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ia’s decision by accident. Although there is some indication134 in 
the legislative record that the Australian Parliament intended 
Corporations Act Section 471C to protect security interests 
from the implementation of the Model Law, there is no evi-
dence that the parliament thought it would be protecting vessel 
arrest provisions in admiralty.135 Interestingly, an examination 
of the security interests created by maritime liens that are pro-
tected from the Australian implementation of the Model Law 
leads one to the conclusion that these exceptions are quite ad-
ventitious. There are only four types of maritime liens that cre-
ate a security interest that is free from the Model Law in Aus-
tralian jurisdictions.136 More importantly, each of the four 
types of liens covers an area of maritime commerce and an op-
eration of admiralty law that is essential to the success of ship-
ping at sea.137 The public policies that benefit from the liens are 
still vital today as a part of the modern shipping industry. 
2. The Security Interests Guaranteed by Australian Maritime 
Liens 
The first Australian maritime lien that creates a security in-
terest is the maritime lien arising from a claim of salvage.138 It 
is good policy that whenever and wherever one ship finds an-
other in distress, the first ship lends assistance.139 The assist-
ing ship is said to be the salvor of the distressed ship, and, as 
the High Court of Admiralty stated in The Two Friends 
(M’Dougal, Master), “every person assisting in rescue has a lien 
on the thing saved. He has, as it has been argued, an action in 
                                                                                                                                     
 134. See CLERP, supra note 121, at 35; Cross Border Insolvency Act 2008 
(Cth) s 20 (Austl.). 
 135. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 471C (Austl.). 
 136. “A reference in subsection (1) to a maritime lien includes a reference to 
a lien for: (a) salvage; (b) damage done by a ship; (c) wages of the master, or 
of a member of the crew, of a ship; or (d) master’s disbursements.” Admiralty 
Act 1988 (Cth) s 15(2) (Austl.). 
 137. The ranking of these liens among one another is conveniently irrele-
vant for the purposes of this Note, because all four types of lien vest security 
rights in the creditor. 
 138. As previously mentioned, admiralty law is very much sui generis, and 
an additional article could be written discussing the intricacies of the right of 
salvage. For more information on salvage as a doctrine see W.R. KENNEDY, 
LAW OF SALVAGE (5th ed. 1985). 
 139. TETLEY, supra note 13, at 329–40. 
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personam also; but his first and his proper remedy is in rem.”140 
This right of salvage is designed to make it lucrative for ships 
to aid one another and to prevent “embezzlement” or piracy.141 
If this lien from salvage rights is not defended against bank-
ruptcy stays granted by the Model Law, then the impetus to 
aid ships in distress begins to erode, which would be contrary 
to public policy.142 It is true that the law could simply require 
ships to assist one another, but that would be inherently diffi-
cult to enforce on the open sea.143 Even though the Australian 
statutes only accidentally protect maritime liens based on sal-
vage rights, it is a fortuitous coincidence, as the shipping in-
dustry would be greatly harmed if the institution of salvage 
were undermined by the Model Law.144 
The second of the four security interests created by Australi-
an maritime liens is the security interest arising from collision 
damage done by a ship.145 For obvious reasons, a collision or 
allision can cause extensive damage to the vessel and its sur-
rounding environs.146 The policy reason for the priority of this 
lien type over others is based on the size of seagoing vessels 
                                                                                                                                     
 140. The Two Friends (M’Dougal, Master), (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 174 (Ad-
mlty) 176; 1 C. Robinson 271. 
 141. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869). 
 142. KENNEDY, supra note 138, at 43. 
 143. See Mason v. Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240, 266 (1804) 
If the property of an individual on land be exposed to the greatest 
peril, and be saved by the voluntary exertions of any person whatev-
er; if valuable goods be rescued from a house in flames, at the immi-
nent hazard of life by the salvor, no remuneration in the shape of 
salvage is allowed. The act is highly meritorious, and the service is 
as great as if rendered at sea. Yet the claim for salvage could not, 
perhaps, be supported. It is certainly not made. Let precisely the 
same service, at precisely the same hazard, be rendered at sea, and a 
very ample reward will be bestowed in the courts of justice. 
Id. 
 144. Justin S. Stern, Smart Salvage: Extending Traditional Maritime Law 
to Include Intellectual Property Rights in Historic Shipwrecks, 68 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2489, 2492 (2000). 
 145. In the modern context, this category includes damage from collisions 
with the ship and damage caused directly by the ship’s actions, called ship 
tort liens. TETLEY, supra note 13, at 387–91. 
 146. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 757 (5th ed. 
2012). 
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and their capacity to cause massive amounts of damage.147 This 
is an especially salient point given the size of modern bulk car-
riers, tankers, and container ships.148 A shipwreck close to a 
port, even of a relatively small, noncommercial vessel, can have 
an enormous cost in terms of both economic loss and lives, as 
demonstrated by the wreck of the Costa Concordia.149 This is to 
say nothing of other types of maritime disasters, an obvious 
example being the Deepwater Horizon debacle.150 It is good pub-
lic policy to hold the masters of vessels responsible for such 
maritime catastrophes that take place under their command.151 
It is difficult to imagine Carnival Cruise Lines, operator of the 
Costa Concordia, or BP, an operator of the Deepwater Horizon, 
escaping from liability for damages caused by the vessels under 
their control simply by filing for bankruptcy. Yet, if either cor-
poration had filed for bankruptcy abroad, the validity of mari-
time claims against them would have been at issue.152 Once 
again, the Australian statute, albeit accidentally, protects the 
security interests in maritime liens created by collision damage 
and ship torts, which are traditional maritime liens essential to 
maritime commerce and the safe operation of seagoing ves-
sels.153 
                                                                                                                                     
 147. TETLEY, supra note 13, at 387–90. 
 148. In the trial following the Exxon-Valdez oil spill, the jury awarded US$5 
billion for punitive damages, which were later reduced to US$507.5 million, 
in addition to US$507.5 million for actual damages. Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008). 
 149. The recent Costa Concordia disaster is evidence of this and, even 
though the loss of life takes clear precedence, the long-term economic loss to 
the pleasure cruise industry should not be forgotten when tabulating dam-
age. Gaia Pianigiani, Search Is On for Survivors From Cruise Ship That Ran 
Aground, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, at A10. 
 150. On April 20, 2010, a drillhead blowout on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig 
resulted in a large explosion. The oil rig burned for a day and a half before it 
sank, but the damage to the oil well resulted in a spill of about 4.9 million 
barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico between April 20 and July 15, 2010. See 
Campbell Robertson, Search Continues After Oil Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
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water Horizon OIL SPILL, (2011) available at 
http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/DWH/FOSC_DWH_Report.pdf. 
 151. See generally TETLEY, supra note 13, at 387–416 (discussing the policy 
behind and function of collision damage maritime liens). 
 152. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 11–18. 
 153. See TETLEY, supra note 13, at 387–90. 
2014] ADMIRALTY & BANKRUPTCY 1199 
The third type of maritime lien held in Australia to create a 
security interest is a lien for the “wages of the master, or of a 
member of the crew, of a ship.”154 The importance of ensuring 
the pay of seamen and ships’ masters cannot be understated.155 
In an economic analysis, if seamen are not reliably paid for 
their work, they will leave the shipping industry to seek jobs 
where they are more regularly reimbursed. Without captains 
and crews, the shipping industry ceases to function for obvious 
reasons. All of that is to say nothing of the human rights issues 
and labor struggles that plagued seamen in the past that have 
only recently, in the grand scale of admiralty law, been molli-
fied by legislative and judicial action.156 Another facet of the 
wage problem is the potential for criminal activity if seamen 
and masters are not paid.157 Shipping vessels are mobile, ex-
pensive, and often filled with valuable cargo.158 Piracy is a very 
real risk on modern shipping lanes, and if seamen and ship 
masters are not adequately compensated, desperados may not 
be confined to operating dinghies off the coast of Somalia.159 As 
such, the Australian protection of the security interest in a 
maritime lien for seamen’s and ship masters’ wages conven-
iently serves the interests of the public. 
The fourth and final type of Australian maritime lien that is 
protected from a stay granted by the Model Law is a lien for a 
ship master’s disbursements.160 This is similar to a lien for ne-
cessities161 but applies to purchases made by the ship’s master 
from his own money or on his own credit in the pursuance of 
his duties to the ship and crew.162 The logic behind this type of 
lien is similar to that of the lien for wages mentioned above. 
                                                                                                                                     
 154. Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) s 15(2)(c) (Austl.). 
 155. Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78, Ltd., 749 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (5th Cir. 
1985) (“Seamen, of course, are wards of admiralty whose rights federal courts 
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 156. 46 U.S.C. § 50101 (2014). 
 157. See TETLEY, supra note 13, at 267–69. 
 158. See U.S. Waterborne Foreign Trade by U.S. Custom Districts, supra 
note 109. 
 159. Jeannette Catsoulis, Stolen Seas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2013, at C10. 
(discussing a recent documentary on Somali Pirates). 
 160. Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) s 15(2)(d) (Austl.). 
 161. Necessities are things purchased on credit by a ship underway that the 
ship requires to continue its voyage: for example, food and water for the crew, 
medical supplies, fuel oil, and repairs. TETLEY, supra note 13, at 551–52. 
 162. Id. at 419. 
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Without the assurance of reimbursement, a ship’s master may, 
at best, be required to unjustly pay the price of the shipowner’s 
default. At worst, the ship’s master may either shirk his duty 
by not purchasing the necessities required for the safe and suc-
cessful operation of his vessel, or even turn to crime in order to 
make up his shortfall.163 This maritime lien is so zealously en-
forced that in one case a commercial shipping vessel was sold 
in a Canadian small claims court to pay a mere CA$251.00 
master’s disbursement.164 Once again, the Australian exception 
protects those most at risk of unjust treatment in a bankruptcy 
action under the Model Law—secured creditors. 
Based upon the Australian case law and the lucky congruity 
of Australian statutory law, the most important types of mari-
time liens—those for salvage, collision damage, master’s or 
crew’s wages, and master’s disbursements—are protected in 
Australian jurisdictions from the Model Law’s ham-fistedness. 
There is a solution to the battle between vessel arrest and 
bankruptcy in the United States that can be distilled from the 
Australian solution to the same conflict. 
IV. RESTORING BALANCE TO THE SCALES 
Ultimately, bankruptcy and admiralty are “both alike in dig-
nity.”165 Both regimes protect valuable economic interests and 
both have their place in the legal system. Under Chapter 15, 
bankruptcy’s protection of debtors has expanded significantly, 
while it simultaneously constricted admiralty’s protection of 
creditors. This imbalance causes a great deal of harm to mari-
time commerce. One should not forget, however, exactly how 
powerful the vessel arrest and attachment provisions of U.S. 
maritime law can be if not kept reasonably in check. An exam-
ple of maritime attachments getting out of control and subse-
quently being reigned in is readily available in the EFT line of 
cases, which will be discussed at the end of this section.166 Ad-
ditionally, a discussion of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence 
                                                                                                                                     
 163. See Epstein v. Corporacion Peruana de Vapores, 325 F.Supp. 535 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (ship’s master bought 2.2 million cigarettes and forty cases of 
liquor intending to smuggle them internationally). 
 164. Osborn Refrigeration Sales & Services Inc. v. The Atlantean I, [1979] 2 
F.C. 661 (Fed. Ct. of Can.). 
 165. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1. 
 166. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
2014] ADMIRALTY & BANKRUPTCY 1201 
evinces a trend of U.S. courts increasing the difficulty with 
which foreign parties can gain access to the U.S. judicial sys-
tem.167 Once these final issues have been addressed, this Note 
will then move on to the proposed solution to the conflict be-
tween bankruptcy and admiralty. 
A. The Weight: Bankruptcy Has Waxed Full 
Proponents of stronger admiralty protections have argued 
that “any international insolvency treaty should include a pro-
vision recognizing the primacy of admiralty law over maritime 
assets.”168 While the effectiveness of Chapter 15 could be com-
promised if Congress begins to carve out exceptions, it is clear 
that the chapter, as it stands now, is dysfunctional if not ac-
tively harmful in cases of maritime bankruptcy. Other nations 
that have adopted the Model Law have no specific provision 
protecting maritime assets in maritime insolvencies,169 but 
many of the larger shipping nations that have implemented the 
Model Law also lack the robust tools of the U.S. admiralty sys-
tem.170 Furthermore, Australia, at least, has recognized that 
the lack of protection for maritime assets from the Model Law 
has created significant difficulties in admiralty actions.171 The 
nations that possess maritime capabilities similar to those of 
the United States have started to adjust their implementations 
of the Model Law in an effort to level the playing field between 
admiralty and insolvency once again.172 Furthermore, there is 
strong precedent in favor of treating admiralty disputes differ-
ently from other actions in the United States.173 Aside from the 
                                                                                                                                     
 167. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1677 (2013) 
(holding that the threshold for foreign parties to bring suit in the United 
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 173. Admiralty is one of few disciplines specifically protected in the Consti-
tution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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Constitution’s explicit treatment of admiralty jurisdiction,174 
there is a long history of Supreme Court jurisprudence that 
recognizes admiralty as being separate from the common 
law.175 Therefore, bankruptcy courts cannot determine admi-
ralty suits. Even if bankruptcy courts had the proper jurisdic-
tion, bankruptcy, as a discipline, looks at suits through a lens 
that focuses on land-based, national concerns.176 Admiralty 
disputes are inherently focused on the uniquities of maritime 
commerce and should be adjudicated with that focus in mind.177 
B. Admiralty Ascendant 
Admiralty, however, should not be permitted to run rough-
shod over debtor rights, as it was in the EFT line of cases. In 
these cases, the Second Circuit successfully stopped an abuse of 
maritime attachment procedure.178 Beginning with Winter 
Storm Shipping, Ltd. v. TPI,179 the Southern District of New 
York allowed a creditor to use a maritime attachment to seize a 
shipper’s electronic funds transfer.180 Over the course of the 
next seven years, the Second Circuit was inundated with mari-
time attachment claims on EFTs. Indeed, four years after the 
Winter Storm decision, the Second Circuit questioned the ve-
racity of that decision in Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner 
                                                                                                                                     
 174. Id. 
 175. “Admiralty courts proceed according to the principles, rules, and usag-
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 180. EFTs are electronic monetary transactions that take place during the 
regular course of business. Due to the high concentration of financial institu-
tions in New York City, it became very common for creditors to attach the 
EFTs of a debtor involved in contracts that were just barely maritime in na-
ture, as required by the procedural rules. Jaldhi, supra note 162, at 62. 
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Smith Pty Ltd.181 In 2009, the Second Circuit specifically over-
turned Winter Storm, holding that “Winter Storm’s reasons 
[are] unpersuasive and its consequences untenable.”182 The 
EFT cases are a prime example of the problems created when 
the powerful tools of admiralty are allowed to go unchecked, 
similar to the way in which Chapter 15 has gone unchecked 
since its adoption from the Model Law.183 Just as powerful ad-
miralty provisions had to be brought back under control in the 
EFT cases, the ability of current bankruptcy law to disrupt 
vessel arrest and attachment actions must also be brought to 
heel. 
V. KIOBEL AND THE SUPREME COURT’S DISINTEREST IN FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 
Admiralty law, as mentioned above, is international by its 
very nature.184 When admiralty combines with international 
bankruptcy, it is almost inevitable that one party will be for-
eign to the United States. The Supreme Court, however, re-
cently moved away from U.S. judicial involvement in foreign 
suits.185 In its decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
the Supreme Court raised the bar for access to American 
courts, and it is likely that the Court would do the same in a 
maritime bankruptcy if given the opportunity.186 While it may 
appear at first glance that strict application of Chapter 15 pro-
tections would keep foreign matters out of U.S. courts by rele-
gating the procession of creditors to foreign proceedings, there 
are several problems with that assumption.187 First, the Court’s 
decision in Kiobel explicitly stated that some “distinct Ameri-
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1204 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:3 
can interest” had to be implicated in order for foreign parties to 
gain access to the U.S. legal system via the Alien Tort Stat-
ute.188 In the vessel arrest actions with which this Note con-
cerns itself, the creditors are always American in their citizen-
ship, because if they were not, they would not have access to 
U.S. maritime remedies. Surely citizenship can satisfy Kiobel’s 
requirement of “American interest” for access to U.S. courts. 
Additionally, foreign companies have been using the Chapter 
15 bankruptcy provisions to protect their assets located in the 
United States.189 Indeed, the whole purpose of Chapter 15 is to 
protect local assets of distant debtors.190 While such usage may 
not involve U.S. courts in certain types of bankruptcy litiga-
tion, it would take advantage of the U.S. system to serve for-
eign interests, which seems to be precisely what the Supreme 
Court seeks to avoid by its holding in Kiobel.191 Hence, based on 
the stated aims of the Court, the conflict between admiralty 
and bankruptcy must be solved by stronger protections for the 
powers of vessel arrests and attachments. 
CONCLUSION 
“What here shall miss, our toil shall strive to mend.”192 
The combination of Supreme Court trend, maritime bank-
ruptcy dysfunction, and a preexisting, creditor-centric corpus of 
admiralty law, demands a resolution in the current feud be-
tween Chapter 15 bankruptcy protections and admiralty ac-
tions. A curative amendment to Chapter 15 could be based on 
the Australian model, which protects a very limited but vital 
set of maritime liens and rights of action. By reserving admi-
ralty arrest and attachment proceedings to courts sitting in 
admiralty, this solution would go a long way toward ameliorat-
ing the destructive effects that the deployment of the Model 
Law has had on maritime commerce in the United States.193 
Moreover, as U.S. imports from the developing world rise and 
the number of U.S.-based shipping companies falls, there will 
be a corresponding increase in foreign companies filing for 
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Chapter 15 recognition of their bankruptcies in an effort to es-
cape creditors in the United States.194 As these creditors con-
tinue to lose money in the shipping business, they will cease to 
invest in it, leading to a further contraction of the already reel-
ing industry. 
The importance of bankruptcy protections, however, cannot 
be denied. Bankruptcy protections are part of the reason that 
the modern United States economy, and indeed the interna-
tional economy, is as vibrant as it is.195 The ability of bankrupt-
cy to lower the barriers to entry into the economy for entrepre-
neurs is of extreme importance to overall economic health, and 
that is to say nothing of bankruptcy’s ability to keep large cor-
porations running, their products and services flowing into the 
marketplace, and their employees working and earning.196 But, 
as in all things, moderation is critical. Chapter 15 has adminis-
tered a crash course, at least in the United States and Austral-
ia, on the problems associated with overbroad, one-size-fits-all 
international laws, especially such laws that govern legal re-
gimes as disparate and diametrically opposed as bankruptcy 
and admiralty.197 In the instance of vessel arrest, admiralty 
law requires either a statutory protection of its jurisdiction, 
created by the legislature, or a judicial interpretation of Chap-
ter 15 that protects admiralty jurisdiction from bankruptcy 
courts similar to the interpretation in Yu.198 Australia provides 
an excellent example of a nation with a robust merchant ma-
rine possessing tools on par with U.S. vessel arrest, if not at-
tachment, provisions.199 Furthermore, Australia has encoun-
tered an identical problem in its own implementations of the 
Model Law in admiralty cases.200 Australia has responded in an 
appropriate fashion by recognizing the importance of maritime 
liens to the operation of maritime commerce and creating pro-
tections for vessel arrest and attachment, the only effective 
tools that creditors have to enforce those liens.201 Such protec-
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tions will be vital to the health of the United States’ shipping 
industry in the future. Congress must take a cue from the Fed-
eral Court of Australia and craft a provision into Chapter 15 to 
counteract the current abuse of the chapter by debtors seeking 
to sabotage the rights of their creditors. 
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